The United States carried out airstrikes in Iraq in early 2026 that killed several members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition of predominantly Shia militias that operates as a formal branch of the Iraqi security apparatus. The strikes, which the Pentagon characterized as targeting Iran-aligned groups responsible for attacks on American personnel, triggered an immediate mobilization response from multiple Iraqi militia factions, a formal condemnation from the Iraqi government, and renewed calls within the Iraqi parliament to expel remaining U.S. forces from the country. The killings have pushed an already fragile U.S.-Iraq relationship closer to a breaking point, with militia leaders publicly vowing retaliation and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani caught between domestic political pressure and diplomatic necessity.
The fallout extends well beyond the immediate military confrontation. The strikes raise serious legal questions about the authorization under which U.S. forces are operating in Iraq, the status of the PMF as an official Iraqi government entity, and whether the Trump administration’s escalatory posture is consistent with the stated goal of regional stability. This article examines the background of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the legal and political ramifications of the strikes, the Iraqi government’s constrained response, the broader regional implications involving Iran, and what accountability mechanisms exist for American military action in a sovereign nation that has not consented to these operations.
Table of Contents
- What Are the Popular Mobilization Forces and Why Did U.S. Strikes Target Their Members?
- What Legal Authority Is the U.S. Using to Justify Strikes in Iraq?
- How Has the Iraqi Government Responded to the Strikes?
- What Does Iran-Aligned Militia Mobilization Actually Look Like on the Ground?
- What Accountability Mechanisms Exist for U.S. Military Actions in Iraq?
- How Are These Strikes Affecting Ordinary Iraqis?
- Where Is This Heading?
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
What Are the Popular Mobilization Forces and Why Did U.S. Strikes Target Their Members?
The Popular Mobilization Forces, known in Arabic as hashd al-Shaabi, were formally established by an Iraqi government fatwa in 2014 to fight the Islamic State after ISIS captured roughly a third of Iraqi territory, including the major city of Mosul. What began as a loose coalition of volunteer fighters, many drawn from existing Shia militia networks, was codified into Iraqi law in 2016 as an official component of the Iraqi armed forces. The PMF now comprises an estimated 100,000 to 160,000 fighters across dozens of individual brigades, receives funding through the Iraqi defense budget, and answers nominally to the Iraqi prime minister as commander-in-chief. Several of the most powerful PMF factions, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr Organization, maintain close operational and financial ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The Trump administration has drawn a distinction between the PMF as a whole and specific Iran-aligned factions within it, arguing that certain groups operate outside Iraqi government control and function as Iranian proxy forces targeting American troops. This framing is contested by the Iraqi government, which maintains that all PMF units fall under its sovereign authority. The critical tension is this: when the United States strikes PMF members, it is, in a legal and diplomatic sense, striking members of the Iraqi security forces. The comparison would be roughly analogous to a foreign power bombing members of the U.S. National Guard because it deemed certain units to be acting outside federal authority. Whether one accepts the American or Iraqi framing of the PMF’s status fundamentally changes the legal and moral calculus of these strikes.
What Legal Authority Is the U.S. Using to Justify Strikes in Iraq?
The legal foundation for U.S. military operations in Iraq has been crumbling for years. The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq was repealed by Congress in 2023, removing one of the two statutory pillars the executive branch had relied upon. The remaining 2001 AUMF, passed in response to the September 11 attacks, was designed to authorize force against al-Qaeda and associated forces, not against Shia militia groups aligned with Iran. The Trump administration has invoked Article II of the Constitution, claiming inherent presidential authority to protect American forces and personnel, as the primary justification for the strikes. However, Article II self-defense authority has recognized limits. It is generally understood to cover immediate, defensive responses to imminent threats, not preemptive or retaliatory strikes against groups that may pose future risks.
Legal scholars, including several who served in Republican administrations, have noted that the pattern of strikes against PMF targets looks less like force protection and more like an undeclared military campaign that should require congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution. The Iraqi parliament passed a non-binding resolution in January 2020 calling for the expulsion of U.S. forces after the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and PMF deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. While a bilateral agreement has kept some U.S. forces in an advisory capacity, that agreement does not authorize unilateral American combat operations against Iraqi government entities. If the Iraqi government formally revokes consent for the U.S. military presence, the legal basis for any American operations in Iraq would effectively evaporate, regardless of what the White House claims under Article II.
How Has the Iraqi Government Responded to the Strikes?
Prime Minister al-Sudani’s response has reflected the impossible position he occupies. His governing coalition depends on political support from PMF-affiliated parties, several of which hold significant blocs in the Iraqi parliament. At the same time, his government has pursued a diplomatic balancing act aimed at maintaining functional relations with both Washington and Tehran. Following the strikes, al-Sudani issued a statement condemning the attacks as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and summoned the U.S. ambassador for a formal protest, but stopped short of ordering American forces to leave the country. This measured response drew sharp criticism from PMF political leaders.
Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization and a powerful parliamentary figure, publicly demanded that the prime minister set a firm timeline for the withdrawal of all American forces. Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, went further, declaring that the Iraqi government’s failure to protect its own security forces from foreign attack constituted a fundamental breach of the social contract. The political dynamic within Iraq makes escalation likely regardless of what the prime minister prefers. For comparison, consider the aftermath of the Soleimani killing in 2020: the initial parliamentary vote to expel U.S. forces was non-binding, and subsequent governments quietly allowed American troops to remain. But each new strike erodes the political space for Iraqi leaders who want to maintain the relationship with Washington. There is a finite number of times a prime minister can condemn American strikes while continuing to host American troops before his credibility, and his coalition, collapses.
What Does Iran-Aligned Militia Mobilization Actually Look Like on the Ground?
When militia leaders announce mobilization, the practical reality ranges from increased readiness at existing positions to the movement of heavy weapons systems and the activation of reserve fighters. In the days following the U.S. strikes, multiple PMF-affiliated groups relocated rocket and drone assets closer to bases housing American advisors, according to Iraqi security officials cited in regional media. Kata’ib Hezbollah, which the U.S. designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2009, reportedly moved short-range ballistic missile components to forward positions, a significant escalatory step beyond the one-way attack drones and 107mm rockets that have characterized previous rounds of militia attacks on American facilities. The tradeoff the Trump administration faces is straightforward but has no clean resolution.
Striking militia targets may degrade specific capabilities in the short term, but it simultaneously strengthens the political hand of the most hardline factions within the PMF and provides Iran with a compelling recruitment and propaganda narrative. The January 2020 strike that killed Soleimani was supposed to deter further militia aggression; instead, the following years saw the most sustained campaign of militia attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq’s history. Deterrence theory assumes a rational actor who will back down when costs are imposed. The PMF factions most closely aligned with Iran have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to absorb casualties and escalate rather than retreat. This is not a fight where one side can simply hit harder and expect the other to quit.
What Accountability Mechanisms Exist for U.S. Military Actions in Iraq?
The honest answer is: very few that function in practice. The War Powers Resolution requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing forces into hostilities and to withdraw them within 60 days absent congressional authorization. The Trump administration has complied with the notification requirement in a narrow technical sense while arguing that the strikes do not constitute the introduction of forces into hostilities because the operations are conducted by assets already present in the region. This semantic maneuvering is not new to this administration, but it has been stretched further than usual. Congressional oversight has been hampered by political dynamics.
Republican leadership has largely supported the strikes, framing opposition as weakness toward Iran. Democratic critics have raised legal objections but lack the votes to force a binding resolution under the War Powers framework. The limitation that Americans concerned about these operations should understand is that the judiciary has historically declined to adjudicate War Powers disputes, treating them as political questions beyond the court’s competence. This means that the primary accountability mechanism is electoral rather than legal. International accountability is even more constrained. While Iraq could theoretically pursue claims through the International Court of Justice or other bodies, the United States does not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in matters involving the use of force and has historically ignored adverse rulings from international tribunals.
How Are These Strikes Affecting Ordinary Iraqis?
The human cost extends well beyond the fighters killed in the strikes themselves. In one incident, a U.S. strike targeting a PMF convoy struck vehicles on a road also used by civilians near the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, a strategically significant area south of Baghdad that has been under PMF control since 2014.
While the Pentagon reported no civilian casualties, Iraqi medical sources reported treating several people for injuries from secondary explosions. The PMF controls checkpoints, provides security, and in some areas delivers basic services that the Iraqi central government cannot or does not provide. Strikes against PMF infrastructure can disrupt these functions, leaving communities in contested areas more vulnerable to both criminal activity and residual ISIS cells that continue to operate in rural Sunni-majority districts.
Where Is This Heading?
The trajectory is toward a structural breakdown of the U.S.-Iraq security relationship as it has existed since 2014. The advisory mission framework that kept a limited American military presence in Iraq was already being renegotiated before these strikes, with both governments discussing a phased drawdown. The strikes have accelerated Iraqi political momentum toward demanding a complete withdrawal rather than a negotiated transition. If that happens, the United States loses its primary platform for monitoring and containing ISIS remnants in the region, and Iran-aligned groups gain uncontested influence over Iraqi security policy. The broader concern for American foreign policy is that the Trump administration appears to be operating without a coherent theory of how these strikes serve long-term U.S.
interests. Deterrence is not working. Diplomacy is being undermined. The legal authority is threadbare. And each escalation makes the eventual departure from Iraq more chaotic and less favorable to American interests than a negotiated withdrawal would have been. The pattern is recognizable from previous chapters of American military engagement in the Middle East: tactical actions taken without a strategic framework, producing outcomes that are worse than the problems they were meant to solve.
Conclusion
The U.S. strikes that killed members of the Popular Mobilization Forces have set in motion a cascade of military, political, and diplomatic consequences that the Trump administration appears unprepared to manage. Iraqi militias have mobilized, the Iraqi government has been pushed closer to demanding a full American withdrawal, Iran’s influence over Iraqi security politics has been reinforced rather than diminished, and the legal basis for continued U.S. operations grows weaker with each strike conducted without congressional authorization. The distinction the Pentagon draws between the PMF as an institution and specific Iran-aligned factions within it, while analytically useful, does not hold up legally or politically when the strikes kill members of an organization formally integrated into the Iraqi state.
For Americans trying to make sense of these developments, the essential question is not whether Iran-aligned militias are hostile to U.S. interests. They clearly are. The question is whether the current approach of episodic strikes with no political strategy, no congressional mandate, and no Iraqi consent is making the United States safer or less safe. The evidence from two decades of similar operations in the region provides a clear answer. Citizens who believe their government should be accountable for the use of military force abroad should be pressing their representatives to demand a vote on the authorization of these operations, because the constitutional process for going to war exists for exactly this kind of situation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are the Popular Mobilization Forces part of the Iraqi military?
Yes. The PMF was formally incorporated into the Iraqi security forces by law in 2016 and receives funding through the Iraqi defense budget. While individual factions maintain varying degrees of independence, the organization as a whole is legally a component of the Iraqi armed forces under the command of the prime minister.
Does the U.S. have permission to conduct strikes in Iraq?
The U.S. maintains a limited military presence in Iraq under a bilateral advisory agreement, but that agreement does not authorize unilateral combat operations against Iraqi government entities. The Trump administration claims authority under Article II of the Constitution, which covers presidential power to protect American forces, but this justification is disputed by legal scholars and by the Iraqi government itself.
What happened to the 2002 Iraq War authorization?
Congress repealed the 2002 AUMF in March 2023 with bipartisan support. The repeal removed one of the two statutory authorizations the executive branch had used to justify military operations in Iraq. The remaining 2001 AUMF targets al-Qaeda and associated forces, not Shia militia groups aligned with Iran.
Could these strikes lead to a full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq?
That outcome has become increasingly likely. The Iraqi parliament has discussed binding legislation requiring the departure of foreign forces, and the strikes have strengthened the political position of lawmakers who support expulsion. A negotiated drawdown was already under discussion before the strikes; the question now is whether the departure will be orderly or chaotic.
Have these kinds of strikes worked in the past to deter militia attacks?
The historical record suggests they have not. The January 2020 strike that killed Qasem Soleimani and PMF deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was intended as a deterrent but was followed by the most sustained period of militia attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq. Militia groups aligned with Iran have consistently demonstrated willingness to absorb casualties and continue operations.