Yes, the scramble for Iran’s resources after regime change could absolutely spark another conflict — and in many ways, it already is. Iran sits on approximately 157.8 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves (the fourth largest globally), the world’s second largest natural gas reserves accounting for 17.1% of the global total, and a total mineral resource base valued at an estimated $27.3 trillion. The United States, China, Russia, and Gulf Arab states all have competing and in some cases irreconcilable interests in who controls that wealth after any political transition. The February 2026 US-Israeli military campaign against Iran was framed around nuclear and security objectives, but the resource dimension is impossible to ignore when you look at the scale of what is at stake beneath Iranian soil. The current conflict has already destabilized global energy markets, with oil prices surging from roughly $60 per barrel at the start of 2026 to over $100 per barrel by mid-March, and the IRGC warning prices could reach $200 if disruptions continue.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of global oil and 27% of the world’s maritime crude trade flows — triggered the largest emergency reserve release in history, with more than 30 countries agreeing to release 400 million barrels of stockpiled oil. But the deeper question is not about the current fighting. It is about what comes next. If the Iranian regime falls, or even if it does not, the competition over who gains access to Iran’s oil, gas, lithium, copper, zinc, rare earths, and titanium deposits could create a second crisis layered on top of the first. This article examines why the resource scramble is so dangerous, who the main players are, what the specific stakes look like, and what history tells us about how these competitions tend to end.
Table of Contents
- Why Could the Scramble for Iran’s Mineral and Energy Resources Trigger Another Conflict?
- China’s $100 Billion Stake and Why Beijing Will Not Walk Away
- The Strait of Hormuz Chokepoint and Its Cascading Effects on Global Markets
- What the US Wants vs. What It Can Realistically Get
- The Lithium and Critical Minerals Wild Card
- Gulf Arab States and the Regional Power Balance
- Where This Heads If Nobody Blinks
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
Why Could the Scramble for Iran’s Mineral and Energy Resources Trigger Another Conflict?
The answer comes down to concentration and timing. iran does not just have oil and gas. It has 68 different mineral types across approximately 6,000 active mines and 15,000 sites, holding 57 billion tons of proven mineral reserves. In 2023, Iran discovered 8.5 million tons of lithium reserves in Hamadan province — potentially the second largest lithium reserve in the world and the largest outside South America. The country ranks sixth globally in zinc, seventh in copper, ninth in iron ore, and holds the world’s largest barite reserves and second largest feldspar reserves. The Fanuj area in Sistan-Baluchistan alone holds an estimated 3.6 billion tons of titanium reserves. These are not marginal deposits. They are world-class resources that multiple great powers need for defense manufacturing, energy transition technologies, and advanced electronics.
The danger is that any political vacuum in Iran would invite a resource grab before a successor government can consolidate power. Compare this to what happened in Libya after Gaddafi’s fall or in Iraq after 2003, where competing factions and their foreign backers rushed to secure oil infrastructure, often fueling further instability in the process. Iran’s case is potentially worse because the resource portfolio is far more diverse, the geopolitical players involved are more powerful, and the existing dependencies — particularly China’s — run deeper. Iran’s “resistance economy” strategy has deliberately positioned its critical minerals as alternatives to oil dependence, which means these resources are not an afterthought. They are central to the country’s economic identity, and whoever controls them controls the economic future of whatever comes after the current regime. The conflict is already exposing fragilities in global critical minerals supply chains, particularly for defense, advanced technologies, and energy transition materials. If regime change produces prolonged instability rather than a clean political transition, the window for competitive resource grabs widens, and the incentives for external powers to back competing factions increase. That is the mechanism by which a resource scramble becomes a second conflict.
China’s $100 Billion Stake and Why Beijing Will Not Walk Away
china is the single most important external player in Iran’s resource future, and this is not a position Beijing will voluntarily surrender. China absorbs approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports, up from 25% in 2017. In 2025, Iran shipped roughly 1.38 million barrels per day to China, accounting for 13% of China’s total seaborne oil imports. Beyond oil, China has invested over $100 billion in energy and infrastructure projects across Iran. That level of investment creates a structural dependency that no regime change can simply erase. China also controls the majority of global processing capacity for rare earths, lithium, and gallium, giving it a strategic advantage in any post-conflict resource competition that goes well beyond simple buying power.
Even if a new Iranian government were sympathetic to the United States and hostile to Beijing, analysts at the Carnegie Endowment have noted that any successor government “will have no choice but to engage with China,” which holds a monopoly on high-tech goods delivery and remains the primary buyer of Iranian oil. There is no alternative customer at that scale waiting in the wings. However, if the current conflict produces what analysts at Open The Magazine have described as “regime hardening” rather than collapse — where the existing government survives weakened but intact — the dynamic shifts again. A hardened regime would likely deepen its reliance on China and russia out of necessity, potentially locking Western companies out of Iran’s resource sector for another generation. The irony of a US military campaign aimed at regime change producing an outcome that further entrenches Chinese resource dominance is not lost on energy analysts. Russia’s energy infrastructure connecting it to China also provides Beijing a secure alternative energy source, reducing China’s exposure to the Hormuz disruption and giving it the patience to wait out any transition period.
The Strait of Hormuz Chokepoint and Its Cascading Effects on Global Markets
The Strait of Hormuz closure has been the most immediately damaging consequence of the conflict, and it illustrates how resource competition creates escalatory pressure. On March 4, 2026, Iran’s IRGC declared the Strait closed and began attacking ships attempting transit. The IRGC stated that “not a litre of oil” would pass through the Strait and that any vessel linked to the US, Israel, or their allies would be “a legitimate target.” Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, vowed to maintain the blockade. The market response was severe. Brent crude closed at $103.14 per barrel on one trading day after spiking near $120 earlier. The US alone released 172 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve — the largest such release in American history — as part of the broader 30-country, 400-million-barrel coordinated response.
Analysts estimated that prolonged disruption could add 0.8% to global inflation. These are not abstract numbers. They translate directly into higher gasoline prices, increased shipping costs, and economic pain for working families who are already stretched thin. The Hormuz crisis also demonstrates a specific warning: even if the military campaign succeeds in its stated objectives, the economic aftershocks create their own political pressures. countries that depend on Gulf energy exports — much of Asia, parts of Europe — face energy security crises that push them toward cutting separate deals with whatever power structure emerges in Iran. This is exactly the kind of fragmented, competitive dynamic that turns a resource-rich post-conflict state into a contested space rather than a stable one.
What the US Wants vs. What It Can Realistically Get
The United States has both strategic and economic interests in Iran’s resources, but the gap between ambition and achievability is wide. Washington would prefer a post-regime Iran that opens its energy and mineral sectors to Western investment, reduces Chinese influence, and integrates into US-aligned supply chains for critical minerals like lithium, rare earths, and titanium. In theory, a democratic Iran could become a counterweight to Chinese mineral dominance and a major contributor to Western energy transition goals. The tradeoff is that achieving this outcome requires something the US has struggled to deliver in every previous regime change scenario: a stable political transition followed by sustained engagement. Iraq is the most obvious comparison.
The US toppled Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003 with overwhelming military force, but the post-invasion period was characterized by sectarian conflict, economic disruption, and ultimately a significant expansion of Iranian influence over Iraqi politics and oil policy — the exact opposite of what was intended. Libya followed a similar pattern after 2011, where the fall of Gaddafi led to a fractured state where competing militias and their foreign backers fought over oil infrastructure for years. Iran is a country of over 85 million people with a sophisticated bureaucratic state, multiple ethnic groups, and deep institutional ties to both China and Russia. The idea that regime change would produce a clean handover of resource access to Western companies ignores everything we have learned from the past two decades of Middle Eastern interventions. More likely, any transition period would involve prolonged instability during which China leverages its existing investments and relationships, Russia provides diplomatic cover, and Gulf Arab states pursue their own strategic interests — creating exactly the kind of multi-sided competition over resources that generates further conflict.
The Lithium and Critical Minerals Wild Card
Iran’s 2023 discovery of 8.5 million tons of lithium reserves in hectorite clay deposits in Hamadan province introduced a variable that did not exist in previous Middle Eastern resource conflicts. Lithium is the essential input for electric vehicle batteries, grid-scale energy storage, and portable electronics. If these reserves are confirmed at scale, Iran would hold the second largest lithium reserve in the world, potentially reshaping global supply chains for the energy transition. This matters because lithium supply is already a geopolitical flashpoint. China dominates lithium processing, and the US has been racing to build domestic capacity and secure supply agreements with countries like Australia, Chile, and Argentina. A post-conflict Iran with accessible lithium deposits would become an immediate target for competing investment from both sides.
Iran has also been developing rare earth production capacity as part of its resistance economy doctrine, adding another layer of strategic mineral value. The limitation here is significant: mining and processing infrastructure takes years to develop even under stable conditions. Iran’s 6,000 active mines operate under sanctions, with aging equipment and limited foreign technical expertise. Any post-conflict scenario would require massive capital investment just to bring existing operations to international standards, let alone develop new lithium or rare earth extraction at scale. The countries that move fastest to provide that investment — and that tolerate the political risk of operating in a transitional state — will shape Iran’s mineral future. Based on precedent in Africa and Central Asia, China has shown far greater willingness to make those bets than Western companies, which face shareholder pressure, ESG requirements, and political constraints that Chinese state-owned enterprises do not.
Gulf Arab States and the Regional Power Balance
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states have their own calculations in any post-conflict resource scramble. These countries have spent years diversifying away from oil dependence, investing in renewable energy, technology, and tourism. A destabilized Iran that floods markets with discounted oil once sanctions lift or a new government seeks revenue would directly threaten Gulf economic strategies. Conversely, a prolonged conflict that keeps Iranian oil off the market benefits Gulf producers in the short term by supporting higher prices.
The Gulf states also have strategic interests in preventing any single external power — whether the US, China, or Russia — from gaining dominant influence over Iran’s resource sector. The UAE in particular has cultivated a role as a neutral commercial hub with deep ties to both Washington and Beijing. In a post-conflict scramble, Gulf states would likely position themselves as intermediaries and investors, using their sovereign wealth funds and geographic proximity to secure stakes in Iranian energy and mineral projects. This adds yet another layer of competition to an already crowded field, and Gulf-Iranian rivalry has its own long history of proxy conflicts that could reignite under the pressure of resource competition.
Where This Heads If Nobody Blinks
The most dangerous scenario is one where the current conflict produces a weakened but surviving Iranian government, or a fragmented political landscape with no clear successor, while multiple external powers simultaneously pursue access to the country’s $27.3 trillion resource base. History suggests that resource-rich states undergoing political transitions are magnets for foreign intervention, both overt and covert. The Congo, Libya, and Iraq all followed this pattern, and Iran’s resource portfolio dwarfs most of those examples.
The forward-looking reality is that whoever controls Iran’s energy and mineral resources will hold significant leverage over global supply chains for decades. The transition to electric vehicles, renewable energy storage, and advanced defense systems all require exactly the materials Iran has in abundance — lithium, copper, rare earths, titanium. The 2026 conflict may have been launched with nuclear and security objectives in mind, but the resource dimension will likely determine its long-term consequences. If the major powers cannot find a framework for managing competing resource interests in Iran — and nothing in their current behavior suggests they can — then the scramble itself becomes the next conflict.
Conclusion
The bombing campaign against Iran has opened a resource competition of historic proportions. Iran’s 157.8 billion barrels of oil, its massive natural gas reserves, its $27.3 trillion mineral base, and its potentially world-class lithium deposits make it one of the most resource-rich territories on earth. China’s $100 billion in existing investments and 90% share of Iranian oil exports give Beijing a structural advantage that no amount of military force can simply override. The Strait of Hormuz crisis, the oil price surge, and the record-breaking strategic reserve releases all demonstrate that the economic consequences of this conflict extend far beyond Iran’s borders. The core problem is straightforward.
The United States, China, Russia, and Gulf Arab states all want influence over Iran’s resources, and their interests are fundamentally incompatible. If regime change occurs, the competition to fill the vacuum could generate exactly the kind of proxy conflicts and economic warfare that the Middle East has suffered through for decades. If the regime survives in hardened form, Chinese and Russian resource dominance deepens. Either way, the scramble for Iran’s resources is not a hypothetical future risk. It is happening now, and the conditions for it to generate further conflict are already in place.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz?
Approximately 20% of global oil and 27% of the world’s maritime trade in crude oil and petroleum products transit the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s IRGC declared the Strait closed on March 4, 2026, and began attacking ships attempting passage.
How large are Iran’s lithium reserves?
In 2023, Iran discovered 8.5 million tons of lithium reserves in hectorite clay deposits in Hamadan province. If confirmed at full scale, this would make Iran’s lithium reserves the second largest in the world and the largest outside South America.
Why can’t a new Iranian government simply cut ties with China?
China absorbs roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports, has invested over $100 billion in Iranian energy and infrastructure, and controls the majority of global processing capacity for rare earths, lithium, and gallium. Analysts at the Carnegie Endowment have noted that any successor government would have no realistic alternative buyer or technology provider at comparable scale.
How much did oil prices increase because of the 2026 Iran conflict?
Oil prices surged from approximately $60 per barrel at the start of 2026 to over $100 per barrel by mid-March, with Brent crude spiking near $120 at one point. More than 30 countries agreed to release 400 million barrels of stockpiled oil in response, including a record 172 million barrels from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
What critical minerals does Iran have besides oil and gas?
Iran has 68 different mineral types with 57 billion tons of proven reserves. It ranks sixth globally in zinc, seventh in copper, ninth in iron ore, holds the world’s largest barite reserves, the second largest feldspar reserves, and an estimated 3.6 billion tons of titanium reserves in the Fanuj area of Sistan-Baluchistan.