The International Criminal Court technically could investigate war crimes committed by all parties in the 2026 Iran conflict, but the realistic chances of that happening are close to zero. None of the three principal belligerents — the United States, Israel, or Iran — are members of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty. The only procedural path to an ICC investigation would require a UN Security Council referral, and the United States holds veto power on that council. So while human rights organizations are documenting potential violations on every side, the institutional machinery for international criminal accountability remains effectively locked.
That structural blockade matters enormously right now. Since the coordinated US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28, 2026 — killing at least 555 people across 131 counties according to the Red Crescent, including 165 people at an elementary girls’ school in Minab — calls for accountability have intensified from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and a coalition of roughly 60 Iranian opposition groups. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on US military bases and Israeli population centers, including a ballistic missile hit on Beit Shemesh that killed 9 civilians, have drawn their own war crimes allegations. This article examines the jurisdictional barriers facing the ICC, the documented violations on both sides, the geopolitical dynamics blocking accountability, and what alternative paths to justice might exist.
Table of Contents
- Why Can’t the ICC Simply Investigate Both Sides of the Iran Conflict?
- What War Crimes Have Been Alleged Against the US, Israel, and Iran?
- How US Sanctions on the ICC Have Weakened International Accountability
- The UN Security Council Deadlock and Why a Referral Won’t Happen
- Could Alternative Justice Mechanisms Fill the Gap?
- What Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Are Demanding
- Where International Justice Goes From Here
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
Why Can’t the ICC Simply Investigate Both Sides of the Iran Conflict?
The ICC was designed as a court of last resort for the gravest international crimes — genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. But it can only exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states that have ratified the Rome Statute, crimes committed on the territory of member states, or situations referred by the UN Security Council. The United States withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2002 under the Bush administration. Israel signed but never ratified. Iran never signed at all. This means the ICC has no automatic hook into the conduct of any party in this conflict.
Compare this to the ICC’s investigation into the situation in Ukraine, where it could assert jurisdiction because Ukraine accepted the court’s authority over crimes committed on its territory. No analogous mechanism exists here. The conflict is taking place on Iranian soil and in Israeli and Gulf state territories — none of which fall under ICC jurisdiction through treaty membership. The only remaining door is a Security Council referral under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the same mechanism used to refer the situations in Darfur and Libya. But those referrals happened in a different geopolitical era, before the current level of US hostility toward the court. The ICC is also the sole international tribunal with jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of aggression — the act of launching an illegal war. International law experts have characterized the US-Israeli strikes as “clearly illegal, in that they are a breach of the UN Charter, which prohibits unilateral resort to force between states.” But even this charge cannot be brought without either state party consent or a Security Council referral, making it a legal authority that exists on paper but cannot be activated in practice.

What War Crimes Have Been Alleged Against the US, Israel, and Iran?
The allegations cut in every direction. On the US-Israeli side, the deadliest documented incident was a strike on an elementary girls’ school in Minab, southern Iran, that killed 165 people — including more than 85 children — and injured 96 others, according to Al Jazeera reporting. Iran’s UN representative characterized the broader campaign bluntly: “This is not only an act of aggression; it is a war crime and a crime against humanity,” accusing the coalition of deliberately targeting civilian areas. A US Central Command spokesperson rejected that framing, stating, “Unlike Iran, we have never — and will never — target civilians.” On the Iranian side, Human Rights Watch has found that some of Iran’s ballistic missile strikes on populated areas in Israel — which killed 20 civilians — were “likely war crimes.” The retaliatory strikes also killed at least 3 US service members at military installations in Gulf states. International humanitarian law requires that even lawful acts of self-defense be proportionate and distinguish between military and civilian targets.
Iran’s counter-strikes on populated civilian areas fail that test regardless of whether the initial US-Israeli attack was itself unlawful. However, it is critical to note that documentation of violations is not the same as prosecution. Human Rights Watch is investigating strikes by all parties, and an attack on Tehran’s Evin prison was separately called an “apparent war crime.” But without a functioning judicial mechanism, these findings serve as historical record rather than the basis for criminal charges. If a future political shift were to unlock ICC jurisdiction — or if an ad hoc tribunal were created — this documentation would become essential evidence. Until then, it exists in a legal vacuum.
How US Sanctions on the ICC Have Weakened International Accountability
Well before the 2026 iran strikes, the Trump administration had already moved aggressively to neuter the ICC as an institution. On February 6, 2025, President Trump reauthorized economic and travel sanctions against individuals involved in ICC investigations of US citizens or allies, including Israel. By December 2025, the administration had sanctioned additional ICC judges over rulings related to the court’s Gaza war-crimes probe. The ICC, for its part, rejected Israel’s bid to halt its Gaza investigation and maintained arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. These sanctions create a chilling effect that extends far beyond the specific judges targeted.
ICC staff, investigators, and cooperating witnesses all face the implicit threat of US financial retaliation. For a court that already operates on a limited budget and depends on state cooperation for arrests and evidence gathering, American sanctions represent an existential constraint. The practical message is clear: the world’s most powerful military nation will punish anyone who attempts to hold it or its allies accountable through international criminal law. This context makes it nearly impossible to imagine the ICC opening a preliminary examination into the Iran strikes on its own initiative, even setting aside the jurisdictional barriers. The court would be investigating the very government that has sanctioned its personnel. Any prosecutor willing to take that step would face not just legal obstacles but personal financial consequences — a reality that fundamentally undermines the independence the ICC was designed to embody.

The UN Security Council Deadlock and Why a Referral Won’t Happen
The emergency Security Council session on March 1, 2026 illustrated exactly why international accountability remains blocked. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the strikes could trigger a wider regional conflict and called for de-escalation and an immediate ceasefire. China and Russia condemned the US-Israeli strikes. But the council was deeply divided, with most Western and European members declining to explicitly condemn the United States and Israel. The council fell short of issuing a full condemnation, let alone a referral to the ICC. The structural problem is straightforward. Any Security Council referral to the ICC requires the affirmative vote of at least nine of the fifteen council members, with no veto from any of the five permanent members — the US, UK, France, Russia, and China.
The United States would veto any referral that included its own conduct or Israel’s. Russia and China might veto a referral focused solely on Iran’s retaliatory strikes, viewing it as one-sided. The result is complete paralysis. The same veto system that was supposed to prevent great-power conflict now prevents accountability for great-power violence. Compare this to the 2011 Libya referral, which passed unanimously because no permanent member had a strong interest in shielding Muammar Gaddafi. The Iran situation is the opposite — multiple permanent members have direct stakes in the outcome. Without a fundamental restructuring of the Security Council, or the creation of an alternative accountability mechanism outside the ICC framework, the veto wall will hold.
Could Alternative Justice Mechanisms Fill the Gap?
Before the 2026 strikes even occurred, multiple actors had already attempted to use the ICC against Iran through creative jurisdictional arguments. A coalition of approximately 60 Iranian opposition organizations submitted a legal communication to the ICC on February 25, 2026, requesting a preliminary examination under Article 15 of the Rome Statute into alleged crimes against humanity committed by the Iranian regime during its crackdown on domestic protests. Separately, US lawyers Eli Rosenbaum, a former DOJ war-crimes prosecutor, and Elliot Malin had previously filed ICC complaints against Khamenei and IRGC commander Esmail Qaani for alleged complicity in the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, arguing it constituted genocide and crimes against humanity. These filings face severe jurisdictional hurdles — Iran is not an ICC member state, and the crimes alleged occurred on the territory of non-member states. But they reflect a broader strategy of building legal records and testing the boundaries of the court’s authority.
The ICC prosecutor has discretion to open preliminary examinations on the basis of such communications, even if a full investigation may not be jurisdictionally viable. The more realistic path to accountability may lie outside the ICC entirely. The UN General Assembly could establish an independent investigative mechanism, similar to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism created for Syria in 2016. Such a body would lack prosecutorial authority but could collect and preserve evidence for future proceedings. National courts exercising universal jurisdiction — as Germany has done in Syrian war crimes cases — represent another avenue, though prosecuting officials of major military powers presents obvious practical barriers that don’t apply to prosecuting mid-level officials from weaker states.

What Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Are Demanding
Amnesty International has called explicitly for a UN Security Council referral to the ICC and the establishment of international justice mechanisms for Iran. Human Rights Watch has taken a broader approach, investigating strikes by all parties for potential violations of the laws of war, and has already characterized certain Iranian ballistic missile strikes on Israeli civilian areas as “likely war crimes” while labeling the attack on Tehran’s Evin prison an “apparent war crime.” These organizations understand that their documentation may not lead to near-term prosecutions, but they are building an evidentiary record designed to outlast the current political moment.
The work matters even without immediate legal consequences. When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established in 1993, much of its early evidence came from human rights organizations that had been documenting atrocities for years before any tribunal existed. The same pattern could eventually apply here — if the political landscape shifts enough to create a viable accountability mechanism, the factual groundwork will already be laid.
Where International Justice Goes From Here
The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the February 28 strikes — confirmed by multiple sources — adds a layer of complexity. With Iran’s supreme leader dead and at least 555 people killed across the country, the political dynamics of any future peace process or accountability effort are deeply uncertain. A reconstituted Iranian government might cooperate with international investigations into the strikes as a condition of diplomatic normalization, or a successor regime might be too consumed by internal power struggles to pursue international legal remedies. The trajectory depends on factors that no legal framework can predict.
What remains clear is that the existing international criminal justice architecture was not built for conflicts between major powers and their adversaries. The ICC works best when it has territorial jurisdiction, state cooperation, and Security Council backing. In the Iran conflict, it has none of these. Until the international community either reforms the Security Council veto system, expands the ICC’s jurisdictional reach, or builds alternative accountability mechanisms, the gap between documented atrocities and actual prosecution will persist — and civilians on all sides will bear the cost of that gap.
Conclusion
The ICC’s potential to investigate both sides of the 2026 Iran conflict is real in theory and nearly nonexistent in practice. Jurisdictional barriers, US veto power, and active American sanctions against the court itself form a triple lock against meaningful investigation. Meanwhile, documented violations continue to mount on all sides — from the Minab school strike that killed over 85 children to Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israeli and Gulf state civilian areas that Human Rights Watch has characterized as likely war crimes.
For those tracking government accountability, the takeaway is sobering. International criminal law applies unevenly, and the mechanisms designed to enforce it depend on the political will of the very powers most likely to commit large-scale violations. The documentation work of organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch remains essential, not because it will trigger immediate prosecution, but because it creates an evidentiary foundation that could support accountability whenever — if ever — the political conditions change. In the meantime, the ICC’s authority over this conflict exists primarily as an aspiration, not a functioning check on power.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the ICC currently investigating the 2026 Iran conflict?
No. As of March 2, 2026, the ICC has not opened a formal investigation into the conflict. The primary barrier is that none of the three main parties — the United States, Israel, or Iran — are members of the Rome Statute, and the only alternative path, a UN Security Council referral, is blocked by the US veto.
What is the difference between a preliminary examination and a formal investigation at the ICC?
A preliminary examination is an initial assessment by the ICC prosecutor to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed. It does not require full jurisdiction to begin, and the prosecutor can initiate one based on communications from outside parties. A formal investigation involves active evidence collection, witness interviews, and can lead to arrest warrants — but requires established jurisdiction.
Could national courts prosecute war crimes from the Iran conflict?
In principle, yes. Under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, some national courts — particularly in Europe — can prosecute war crimes regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrators. Germany has successfully used this approach for Syrian war crimes cases. However, prosecuting officials of major military powers like the US or Israel would face enormous practical and political obstacles.
What war crimes have been alleged against each side?
Against the US and Israel, allegations include the targeting of civilian infrastructure, most notably the strike on a girls’ school in Minab that killed 165 people including over 85 children. Against Iran, Human Rights Watch has found that some ballistic missile strikes on populated areas in Israel — killing 20 civilians — were “likely war crimes.” International law experts have also characterized the initial US-Israeli strikes as a violation of the UN Charter’s prohibition on unilateral use of force.
What are the US sanctions on the ICC?
President Trump reauthorized economic and travel sanctions in February 2025 against individuals involved in ICC investigations of US citizens or allies like Israel. Additional ICC judges were sanctioned in December 2025 over rulings related to the Israeli war-crimes probe. These sanctions restrict the financial assets and travel of targeted individuals and create a chilling effect on ICC operations.
Has anyone filed complaints with the ICC related to this conflict?
Yes. A coalition of approximately 60 Iranian opposition organizations submitted a legal communication to the ICC on February 25, 2026, requesting a preliminary examination into alleged crimes against humanity by the Iranian regime. Separately, US lawyers Eli Rosenbaum and Elliot Malin had previously filed ICC complaints against Khamenei and IRGC commander Esmail Qaani for alleged complicity in the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack.