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Can Congress Block Russia Sanctions Relief? CAATSA Section 216, Explained

White House and Kremlin officials have talked through possible postwar business ventures, from a revived Sakhalin-1 oil project to potash exports, as incentives in Ukraine peace talks, according to a Financial Times report published October 27, 2026. Nearly every idea on the list would run into US sanctions, which puts the Congress Russia sanctions relief review law back at the center of the story.

Where it stands: As of October 28, no report had surfaced of the administration sending Congress a review notice for any of the reported proposals, and the AP reported that “the House and Senate are on recess until after Election Day,” which falls on Nov. 3.

The FT attributed its account to people familiar with the matter. In the words of one unnamed US official, any economic pacts “would be included in and subject to a comprehensive peace framework that stops the killing in this brutal war; nothing is finalised.” The paper added that US officials “have repeatedly stated the ventures would not happen until the war was over.” ExxonMobil, the only US partner in Sakhalin-1, stated in 2025 that it was discussing compensation with Russia for its seized stake but had no plans to restart work there; Boeing declined to comment on titanium; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not respond; and a spokesperson for envoy Kirill Dmitriev declined to comment.

Why would the FT-reported deals need sanctions relief?

Because several of the named partners and products are under US or EU restrictions today. The FT’s own reporting flags one case directly: relaxing potash sanctions and shipping through Baltic ports is “a move that would require the EU to lift sanctions.”

On the US side, Lukoil is a clear example. The FT says the two governments discussed selling Lukoil’s foreign assets to what it called “White House-connected investors.” The Treasury Department designated Lukoil and Rosneft, Russia’s two largest oil companies, in October 2025, and said that “All entities owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft and Lukoil are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024, even if not designated by OFAC.” Rosneft’s subsidiary now operates Sakhalin-1 after Moscow seized Exxon’s stake in 2022.

Which law governs any easing depends on which order created the sanction. That is where the 2017 statute comes in, and where its limits show.

What is the Congress Russia sanctions relief review in CAATSA section 216?

It is a rule that makes the president tell Congress before easing certain Russia sanctions, then gives lawmakers a window to block the move. It sits in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which the House passed on July 25 and the Senate on July 27 of 2017. The law was “Approved August 2, 2017,” during Trump’s first term.

Section 216, codified at 22 U.S.C. 9511, says the president “shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.” Three kinds of action trigger it: ending covered sanctions, waiving them for a particular person, and a licensing step that significantly changes US policy toward Russia. The statute excludes “the routine issuance of a license that does not significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.”

The review clock runs 30 calendar days. It stretches to 60 days for reports filed between July 10 and Sept. 7. During the review, “the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted.”

Which Russia sanctions does section 216 cover, and which does it miss?

By its text, it covers CAATSA’s own title II, two 2014 Ukraine laws and several Obama-era executive orders that Congress wrote into law. Critics say that leaves out much of what came after the 2022 invasion.

Sanctions authority What the law says about review
CAATSA title II and the two 2014 Ukraine laws Named in section 216; relief goes to Congress first
Codified 2014 orders (13660, 13661, 13662, 13685) Named in section 216
EO 14024 (2021), basis of the Rosneft and Lukoil listings Not on the 216 list; NOPE Act sponsors want it added
2022 oil import ban (Public Law 117-109) Own off-ramp: Ukraine-accepted deal, 90-day wait
Graham Act (2026) Ending it needs a Ukraine-accepted peace deal; waivers need a certification

Executive Order 14024, which President Biden signed on April 15, 2021, does not appear on that list. It is the order Treasury used for the 2025 oil-company designations. NewsNation, reporting on a bipartisan Senate bill, put it plainly: the review framework “only covers sanctions that were in place when it was enacted in 2017 and doesn’t cover additional sanctions imposed after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.” That reading comes from the bill’s sponsors and from NewsNation; no court has tested it.

Can Congress actually stop a sanctions rollback with a vote?

Yes, but only by passing a law. If a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted, the code says, “the President may not take that action.” Passage of such a resolution also freezes the action “for a period of 12 calendar days” while the president decides whether to sign or veto.

Because a disapproval measure goes to the president’s desk, it can be vetoed. The Congressional Research Service described the tool as a “(presumably) veto-proof” resolution, which in practice means margins large enough to override a veto: two-thirds of each chamber. The closest precedent came in January 2019, when “The House adopted H.J.Res. 30 to disapprove the delisting of Rusal by a vote of 362-53,” a test of the same statute during Trump’s first term.

Where do the 2022 oil ban and the Graham Act fit?

They add two more locks, each with its own key. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, “Approved April 8, 2022,” bars Russian energy imports. A president can lift that ban only by certifying, among other things, a deal “that is accepted by the free and independent government of Ukraine,” and the lifting takes effect 90 days later unless Congress enacts a disapproval resolution. As of October 28, no source reported that certification being made.

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The Graham Act followed in September. According to Akin Gump, “On September 18, 2026, President Trump signed into law” the measure after House and Senate votes of 262-159 and 86-11. Ending its sanctions requires that Russia have “signed a peace agreement that is accepted by the free and independent Government of Ukraine,” followed by a 30-day wait. The act also lets the president waive provisions with a national-interest certification, and Trump did so in Executive Order 14436, dated October 16, 2026. Akin Gump notes the act keeps Treasury’s power to issue general licenses “without congressional review (Section 114).”

ABC News reported that the waiver “does not affect existing sanctions imposed previously by executive order,” but that it waives the clause that had locked those sanctions in place.

What have lawmakers argued about the review law this year?

Democrats have argued that the administration skipped the notice step. In May, Sen. Michael Bennet and 14 colleagues wrote that a spring oil license “flies in the face of a requirement under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) to notify Congress 30 days before taking such an action.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, asked about the later diesel deal, said the administration is acting within “both its legal authorities and political mandate,” according to CNN.

A bipartisan fix is pending. The No Oil Profits for Enemies (NOPE) Act, led in the Senate by Ruben Gallego and Chuck Grassley and co-sponsored by Richard Blumenthal and Roger Wicker, would pull the executive orders tied to the Russia emergency, which Trump extended in April 2025, into the review and treat any license touching Russian oil exports as one that “significantly alters U.S. foreign policy.” A House version, H.R. 9552, was filed on June 30, 2026 by Reps. Keating and Moylan, according to the bill text.

The fight echoes 2017, when Lindsey Graham, whose name is now on the new sanctions law, argued for the original review and said: “Sanctions relief must be earned, not given.” As of October 28, no source reported a committee vote on either NOPE bill.

Related: Can Congress undo Trump’s Graham Act waiver? · Four routes to block the diesel deal · What lawmakers in both parties say about Russia deals

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Congress have to approve lifting Russia sanctions?

For the sanctions listed in CAATSA section 216, the president must report the plan to Congress first and wait out a review period, usually 30 days. Congress can stop the move only by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval. Sanctions outside that list follow other rules.

Can Trump lift sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil without Congress?

Treasury blocked both companies under Executive Order 14024, which is not on the section 216 list. Sponsors of the NOPE Act say the review framework does not reach sanctions added after 2022 and want to change that. No court has ruled on the question.

Has the White House sent Congress a section 216 report on the FT-reported deals?

As of October 28, no such report had been reported. The FT itself quoted a US official saying nothing is finalised and that any economic agreement would sit inside a broader peace framework.

What is a joint resolution of disapproval?

It is a measure that both chambers pass and the president signs, or that Congress passes over a veto. Under section 216, once one is enacted the president may not take the reviewed sanctions action.

Did the Graham Act waiver lift existing Russia sanctions?

No. ABC News reported that the October 16 order does not affect sanctions already imposed by executive order, though it waives a provision that had required those sanctions to stay in place.

Sources


This article is news reporting and analysis based on the public sources listed above, as they stood on the dates shown. Where officials, lawmakers or analysts disagree, including on whether an action is lawful, their positions are attributed to them; Donald Trump Class Action is not a court and nothing here is legal advice. Facts in a developing story can change.

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