Rep. Ro Khanna and Rep. Thomas Massie are forcing Congress to confront a question it has dodged for decades: whether the president can take the country to war without a vote. The two lawmakers — a California Democrat and a Kentucky Republican — are leveraging expedited procedures under the War Powers Resolution to bring H.Con.Res. 38 to the House floor, a measure that would direct President Trump to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities against Iran unless Congress explicitly authorizes military action through a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.
The push became urgent after Trump ordered military strikes on Iran without formal congressional approval, as reported on February 28, 2026. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries and Democratic leadership announced on February 26 that they would force the war powers vote as soon as Congress reconvened. The resolution has 76 Democratic co-sponsors in addition to Khanna, though Massie remains the sole Republican willing to put his name on it. That lopsided support tells you almost everything about where this vote is headed — and why it matters anyway. This article breaks down the bipartisan mechanics behind H.Con.Res. 38, the procedural tools Khanna and Massie are using to bypass committee, the opposition lining up against the resolution, and what it all means for congressional war powers authority going forward.
Table of Contents
- Why Are Massie and Khanna Crossing Party Lines to Force a Congressional Vote on Iran War Powers?
- How the War Powers Resolution Lets Two Members Bypass the Entire Committee Process
- The Opposition to the Iran War Powers Resolution and What It Reveals
- What a Congressional Vote on Iran Actually Accomplishes — Even If It Fails
- Snowstorms, Retreats, and the Procedural Obstacles Delaying the Vote
- The Historical Pattern of War Powers Fights in Congress
- What Comes Next for Congressional War Powers and Iran Policy
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
Why Are Massie and Khanna Crossing Party Lines to Force a Congressional Vote on Iran War Powers?
The alliance between Khanna and Massie is unusual but not unprecedented. Both men have long held non-interventionist positions that put them at odds with their respective party establishments. Khanna, a progressive Democrat, has consistently argued that military action without congressional authorization violates the Constitution. Massie, a libertarian-leaning Republican, has voted against defense spending bills and military authorizations that most of his GOP colleagues rubber-stamp. Their collaboration on H.Con.Res. 38 reflects a shared constitutional conviction rather than any broader political alignment. The resolution was originally introduced in June 2025 during the 12-day war between Israel and iran, before the United States struck Iran’s nuclear sites.
At the time, it was a preemptive measure designed to assert congressional authority before the executive branch could act unilaterally. The fact that Trump later did exactly what the resolution sought to prevent — ordering strikes on Iran without a formal vote — transformed the bill from a hypothetical guardrail into a direct rebuke of presidential action. What makes this pairing notable is the contrast with how most bipartisan coalitions work in Congress. Typically, cross-party efforts involve moderates from both sides meeting in the middle. The Khanna-Massie partnership is the opposite: two members on the ideological fringes of their parties who agree on the narrow but fundamental principle that war requires a vote. Compare this to the joint statement from Rep. Mike Lawler, a New York Republican, and Rep. Josh Gottheimer, a New Jersey Democrat, who opposed the resolution — that is the more conventional bipartisan alignment, centrists united by hawkish foreign policy instincts rather than constitutional originalism.
How the War Powers Resolution Lets Two Members Bypass the Entire Committee Process
Khanna and Massie are not relying on the goodwill of House leadership to schedule their vote. They are using Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, a Vietnam War-era law passed in 1973 specifically to check executive military power. This provision grants privileged status to certain resolutions, meaning they can bypass committee consideration entirely and force a floor vote. It is one of the few procedural tools available to rank-and-file members that leadership cannot easily block. The mechanism works like this: once a qualifying resolution is introduced and the required conditions are met, any member can move to discharge it from committee and bring it directly to the floor. Leadership can delay, but it cannot indefinitely prevent a vote. This is the same tool lawmakers have used in the past to force votes on U.S.
involvement in Yemen and other military engagements. However, there is an important limitation — the resolution is concurrent, meaning it does not carry the force of law and does not require the president’s signature. If it passes, it functions as a formal expression of congressional will, not a binding order. That procedural distinction matters. Even if H.Con.Res. 38 were to pass both chambers, the trump administration could argue it lacks legal enforcement power. Critics of the War Powers Resolution have long contended that its provisions are constitutionally ambiguous, and no president of either party has ever fully accepted its constraints. So while the Section 5(c) mechanism gives Khanna and Massie the ability to force a vote, winning that vote would be the beginning of a constitutional argument, not the end of one.
The Opposition to the Iran War Powers Resolution and What It Reveals
The resolution is expected to fail in the House, and the reasons illuminate the current political dynamics around military force. Near-unanimous Republican opposition is a given — the GOP conference has largely rallied behind Trump’s decision to strike Iran, framing it as a necessary response to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. The joint statement from Lawler and Gottheimer explicitly cited those capabilities as justification for opposing the resolution, arguing that tying the president’s hands would embolden Tehran. More telling is the opposition from within Democratic ranks. A small number of pro-Israel Democrats are expected to break with their party and vote against the resolution. This reflects a tension that has defined Democratic foreign policy debates for years: the pull between progressive anti-war principles and the party’s traditional alignment with Israeli security interests.
During the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict, this same fault line was visible when some Democrats hesitated to criticize U.S. military coordination with Israel even as others demanded restraint. The Lawler-Gottheimer statement is worth examining as a case study in how bipartisanship can cut both ways. While Khanna and Massie represent bipartisan skepticism of executive war-making, Lawler and Gottheimer represent bipartisan hawkishness. Both coalitions claim to be acting in the national interest. The difference is that one coalition is asking for a vote and the other is asking Congress to stay out of the way — a dynamic that says more about the institution’s comfort with deference than about the merits of any particular military action.
What a Congressional Vote on Iran Actually Accomplishes — Even If It Fails
There is a practical argument that a losing vote is still a meaningful vote. When Congress is forced to go on record about military action, every member’s position becomes public. That creates accountability in a way that silence does not. If the strikes on Iran escalate or produce unintended consequences, the members who voted against the resolution will own their choice. If the situation de-escalates, supporters of the resolution can argue that congressional pressure played a role. Either way, the vote creates a paper trail.
The tradeoff is political. For Democrats, forcing a vote they know they will lose risks looking performative. For Republicans, the vote forces them to publicly endorse unilateral executive military authority — a position many of them opposed when Barack Obama considered strikes on Syria in 2013 without congressional approval. Massie himself has pointed to this inconsistency, and his willingness to co-sponsor the resolution underscores the hypocrisy he sees in his own party’s shifting standards depending on who occupies the White House. From a constitutional perspective, every failed war powers vote adds to a pattern of congressional abdication that legal scholars have warned about for decades. Congress has not formally declared war since 1942, relying instead on authorizations for the use of military force that grant broad and often open-ended powers to the executive branch. Each time a war powers resolution fails, it reinforces the precedent that presidents can act first and face no meaningful legislative check after the fact.
Snowstorms, Retreats, and the Procedural Obstacles Delaying the Vote
Even privileged resolutions face real-world obstacles. A Monday vote on H.Con.Res. 38 was delayed due to a snowstorm that disrupted travel to Washington. Congress then left town on Wednesday for a House Democrats’ retreat in Virginia. As of March 1, 2026, the vote has not yet occurred but is expected imminently once Congress reconvenes. These delays matter more than they might appear.
Momentum in Congress is fragile, and every day without a vote gives opponents more time to whip against the resolution and gives the news cycle more time to move on. The War Powers Resolution’s expedited procedures guarantee a vote will eventually happen, but they do not guarantee it will happen while public attention is focused on the issue. If the vote occurs after the immediate crisis has passed, it loses much of its political force, even if its constitutional significance remains. There is also the question of the Senate. Even if the House votes, the resolution would need to pass the Senate as well. Senate procedures are different, and the chamber’s more deliberative pace could introduce additional delays. War powers resolutions have historically faced tougher odds in the Senate, where the foreign policy establishment has traditionally been more deferential to executive authority on military matters.
The Historical Pattern of War Powers Fights in Congress
This is not the first time Congress has attempted to claw back war-making authority, and the track record is mixed at best. In 2019, both chambers passed a war powers resolution to end U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, but President Trump vetoed it. In 2020, the House passed a resolution to limit military action against Iran after the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, but it stalled in the Senate.
The pattern is consistent: Congress musters enough outrage to force a vote, but never enough votes to override a veto or compel a change in policy. What makes H.Con.Res. 38 different — and in some ways more limited — is that it emerged during an active military exchange between Israel and Iran in June 2025, giving it a specificity that some broader war powers measures have lacked. It is not a general statement about executive authority; it is a directive about a specific conflict. That specificity is both its strength, because it forces a clear up-or-down vote on a concrete situation, and its weakness, because it can be dismissed as reactive rather than systemic.
What Comes Next for Congressional War Powers and Iran Policy
Regardless of whether H.Con.Res. 38 passes, the vote will set the terms for the next phase of the debate over Iran policy and executive war-making. If the resolution fails by a narrow margin, it will signal growing unease with unilateral military action and could embolden future efforts to impose constraints.
If it fails overwhelmingly, it will confirm that Congress remains unwilling to assert its constitutional authority over war, no matter which party holds the White House. The Khanna-Massie alliance also raises a question about whether the libertarian-progressive coalition on foreign policy can expand beyond two members. Massie’s willingness to break with his party is notable, but one Republican co-sponsor does not constitute a movement. For war powers advocates, the real test is whether the political cost of opposing these resolutions increases over time — whether voters start holding their representatives accountable for ceding authority to the executive branch, or whether the pattern of deference continues uninterrupted.
Conclusion
The effort by Khanna and Massie to force a House vote on H.Con.Res. 38 is a textbook example of how constitutional principles can create strange bedfellows. A progressive Democrat and a libertarian Republican, united by the belief that the decision to go to war belongs to Congress, are using a 50-year-old procedural mechanism to demand accountability from their colleagues. The resolution has 76 Democratic co-sponsors and one Republican, and it is expected to fail — but the vote itself will put every member of the House on record regarding whether the president should be able to strike Iran without congressional authorization.
For readers tracking government accountability and executive overreach, this vote is worth watching closely. The procedural tools exist for Congress to check presidential war-making power. The question, as always, is whether enough members are willing to use them. The Khanna-Massie resolution will not end that debate, but it will produce a roll call vote that tells you exactly where your representative stands.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is H.Con.Res. 38?
H.Con.Res. 38 is a War Powers Resolution introduced by Rep. Ro Khanna and co-sponsored by Rep. Thomas Massie that directs the president to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities against Iran unless Congress explicitly authorizes military action through a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization.
Does H.Con.Res. 38 have the force of law if it passes?
As a concurrent resolution, it does not require the president’s signature and its legal enforceability is debated. It expresses the will of Congress but does not function the same way as a statute. Presidents of both parties have questioned the binding authority of War Powers Resolution provisions.
How can two members force a vote without committee approval?
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, enacted in 1973, grants privileged status to qualifying resolutions. This allows members to bypass the committee process and bring the resolution directly to the House floor for a vote, a mechanism specifically designed to prevent leadership from burying war powers challenges.
Is this expected to pass the House?
No. The resolution is expected to fail due to near-unanimous Republican opposition and a small number of Democratic defections from pro-Israel members. However, the vote itself forces every member to publicly declare their position on presidential war-making authority.
When will the vote happen?
As of March 1, 2026, the vote has not yet occurred. It was delayed by a snowstorm and a House Democrats’ retreat in Virginia but is expected imminently once Congress reconvenes.
Has a War Powers Resolution ever succeeded in limiting presidential military action?
Congress passed a war powers resolution on Yemen in 2019 with bipartisan support, but President Trump vetoed it. No War Powers Resolution has successfully compelled a president to withdraw forces over executive objection.