Despite the Pentagon’s claims that Iran’s submarine threat has been “eliminated,” more than 20 Ghadir-class midget submarines remain operational and continue to pose a credible danger to commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. These small, purpose-built vessels were designed specifically for the shallow, acoustically challenging waters of the Strait of Hormuz, and they have largely survived the initial waves of Operation Epic Fury strikes that began on February 28, 2026. The distinction matters: what the U.S. military destroyed were Iran’s three aging Kilo-class submarines and its newer Fateh-class boat — the larger, more detectable platforms. What remains is a flotilla of cheap, expendable mini-subs armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles, operating in waters that naturally degrade the sonar systems meant to find them.
As of mid-March 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed. Iran declared it shut on March 4, and the numbers bear that out — tanker traffic dropped roughly 70 percent in the first days and has since fallen to near zero. Over 150 commercial vessels sit anchored outside the strait, unable to transit. At least 13 have been hit with projectiles, six seafarers are dead, and approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude oil remain stranded. The submarine threat is only one layer of a broader asymmetric strategy that includes mines, speedboats, and shore-based missiles, but it is the layer most likely to be underestimated now that Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery has told Congress the undersea problem is solved. This article examines what Iran actually lost, what it kept, and why the remaining submarine fleet still matters for global energy markets and anyone with shipping interests in the Gulf.
Table of Contents
- What Submarines Does Iran Still Have After Operation Epic Fury?
- Why the Persian Gulf’s Geography Favors Iran’s Midget Submarines
- What Weapons Can the Ghadir Submarines Actually Deploy?
- The Mine Threat Multiplied by the Submarine Threat
- Why the Pentagon’s “Threat Eliminated” Claim Is Misleading
- The Insurance and Economic Fallout for Global Shipping
- What Comes Next for the Strait of Hormuz
- Conclusion
- Frequently Asked Questions
What Submarines Does Iran Still Have After Operation Epic Fury?
Before the conflict began, iran operated a submarine fleet built around three tiers. At the top sat three Soviet-era Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines — the IRIS Taregh, IRIS Nooh, and IRIS Yunes — commissioned between 1992 and 1996. These were Iran’s most capable undersea platforms, sometimes called “black hole” submarines for their quiet running. Below them was the IRIS Fateh, a 527-ton domestically built boat commissioned in 2019 and representing Iran’s most modern submarine design. And at the bottom, forming the bulk of the fleet, were 20 to 23 Ghadir-class midget submarines along with several Nahang-class boats, all Iranian-designed and built specifically for operations in the Persian Gulf’s shallow coastal waters. Operation Epic Fury effectively decapitated the top tier. Satellite imagery analyzed by the Critical Threats Project showed all three Kilo-class submarines were already undergoing refit in port at Bandar Abbas when the strikes hit — they never put to sea. At least one, likely the IRIS Taregh, was sunk at its pier, visible as a large scorch mark on satellite photos where the boat had been moored.
In a historically unprecedented engagement, a U.S. Army ATACMS short-range ballistic missile sank another submarine, the first confirmed kill of a submarine by that weapon system. In total, U.S. forces destroyed 17 Iranian warships and at least one confirmed submarine during the initial strikes. What survived, however, is the fleet that Iran always planned to use in a conflict with the United States. The Ghadir-class boats, at roughly 117 tons surfaced, are a fraction of the size of the 3,000-ton Kilo-class submarines. They are harder to find, harder to hit, and Iran has more than 20 of them. By comparison, the U.S. Navy’s emphasis on tracking the larger boats may have inadvertently validated Iran’s strategic bet: invest in quantity, not quality, and build platforms the enemy considers beneath notice until it is too late.
Why the Persian Gulf’s Geography Favors Iran’s Midget Submarines
The Persian Gulf is not the open ocean, and that single fact reshapes every assumption about anti-submarine warfare. The Gulf averages only about 50 meters in depth, with large stretches considerably shallower. The Strait of Hormuz itself — the 21-mile-wide chokepoint through which roughly 27 percent of the world’s maritime crude oil trade passes — features high salinity, variable currents, and pronounced temperature layering. Each of these conditions degrades active and passive sonar performance, creating what naval analysts call a “noisy” acoustic environment where even advanced detection systems struggle to distinguish a small submarine from background clutter. This is precisely the environment the Ghadir-class was designed to exploit. At 125 tons submerged, these boats have a minimal acoustic and magnetic signature compared to conventional submarines. They can sit on the bottom in shallow water, effectively going silent, and wait for targets to come to them. The commercial shipping lanes through the Strait are narrow and predictable — vessels transiting Hormuz follow established traffic separation schemes, meaning a submarine lying in ambush does not need to search for targets.
The targets come to it on a schedule. However, this geographic advantage cuts both ways. The same shallow waters that hide midget submarines also limit their maneuverability and escape options. If U.S. or allied forces can establish persistent surveillance — through a combination of underwater sensors, maritime patrol aircraft, and surface vessels — the confined space becomes a trap rather than a sanctuary. The challenge is that establishing that kind of coverage takes time, and Iran’s strategy does not require its submarines to survive indefinitely. Even a single successful torpedo attack on a commercial tanker would send insurance rates through the ceiling and potentially halt voluntary transits for weeks. The threat does not need to be sustained — it just needs to be believed.
What Weapons Can the Ghadir Submarines Actually Deploy?
Each Ghadir-class submarine carries two 533mm torpedo tubes, which may sound modest until you consider what those tubes can fire. The standard loadout includes Valfajr torpedoes, but the more concerning weapon is the Hoot — a supercavitating torpedo based on Russian technology that travels inside a gas bubble at speeds reportedly exceeding 200 knots. A conventional torpedo moves at 40 to 50 knots, giving a target ship some chance of evasion or countermeasure deployment. A supercavitating torpedo crosses the distance so quickly that there is effectively no reaction time for the crew of a targeted vessel. Beyond torpedoes, Iran has claimed the Ghadir boats can launch Jask-2 cruise missiles from underwater, with an estimated range of 200 to 300 kilometers. If accurate, this means a Ghadir submarine does not need to be anywhere near the Strait of Hormuz to threaten shipping within it — it could fire from a position well inside Iranian territorial waters, complicating the rules-of-engagement calculus for U.S.
forces. A missile launch from a submerged platform is harder to attribute in real time than one from a shore battery or surface vessel, giving Iran a degree of deniability even in an active conflict. The practical question is how many of these advanced weapons Iran actually has in inventory and how reliable they are under combat conditions. Iran’s defense industry has a documented pattern of overstating capabilities for deterrence purposes, and the Hoot torpedo in particular has never been confirmed in combat use. Western analysts are divided on whether the Jask-2 submarine launch capability has been operationally tested beyond controlled demonstrations. But in asymmetric warfare, the uncertainty itself is the weapon. Shipping companies and their insurers do not need to know whether the Hoot works perfectly — they just need to know it might work at all.
The Mine Threat Multiplied by the Submarine Threat
Iran’s undersea strategy does not rely on submarines alone. The combination of mines and submarines creates a layered threat that is far more dangerous than either would be in isolation. U.S. forces have sunk 16 Iranian minelayers since the conflict began, but Iran retains more than 80 percent of its small boats and minelaying capability. Intelligence assessments indicate Iran has laid “a few dozen” mines in the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, and its stockpile includes thousands of mines of various types — from simple contact mines to more sophisticated influence mines that detonate based on a ship’s magnetic or acoustic signature. The tradeoff for the U.S. Navy is brutal. Mine clearance operations require slow, methodical sweeps by specialized vessels and divers operating in precisely the waters where Ghadir submarines could be lurking. A minehunter proceeding at five knots through a marked channel is an easy target for a torpedo ambush.
Conversely, aggressive anti-submarine patrols require speed and maneuverability that are compromised by the presence of mines. Each threat makes the other harder to address, and Iran knows it. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has trained for decades on exactly this kind of combined-arms approach in the Strait, running exercises that pair mine deployment with submarine ambush and fast-attack boat swarming. For the roughly 150 ships currently anchored outside the Strait, the practical calculation is grim. Even if the U.S. Navy suppresses the submarine threat, the mines remain. Even if the mines are swept, the submarines remain. And behind both sit shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that can target vessels throughout the Strait. Breaking this layered defense requires not just military superiority but time — and every day the Strait remains closed, approximately 15 million barrels of crude and 5 million barrels of other petroleum products fail to reach global markets.
Why the Pentagon’s “Threat Eliminated” Claim Is Misleading
When Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery stated that Iran’s submarine threat had been “eliminated,” he was technically referring to a specific capability set. The Kilo-class submarines were Iran’s only platforms capable of sustained blue-water operations, carrying heavier torpedo loadouts, and operating with the kind of stealth that could genuinely threaten a U.S. carrier strike group in open water. Destroying those boats was a legitimate military achievement, particularly the ATACMS engagement, which demonstrated a new anti-submarine capability that will reshape naval doctrine for years. But the claim is misleading in the context that matters most to commercial shipping and global oil markets. A container ship or crude tanker does not need to be attacked by a 3,000-ton submarine to be sunk or disabled. A single torpedo from a 117-ton Ghadir boat will do the job. The 13 commercial vessels already struck by projectiles — including the U.S.-flagged Stena Imperative — were not hit by Kilo-class submarines. The six seafarers killed so far did not die because of blue-water submarine operations.
The threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf was never primarily about Iran’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy in a symmetrical undersea fight. It was always about Iran’s ability to make the Strait of Hormuz too dangerous for commercial vessels to transit, and that capability remains substantially intact. The danger in the “eliminated” framing is that it encourages premature confidence. Shipping companies watching the news might conclude that with the Kilo-class boats gone, the undersea risk is manageable. Insurers might begin recalculating premiums downward. Tanker operators might consider testing the Strait. But the Ghadir fleet of 20-plus boats was specifically deployed to counter exactly this kind of scenario — Iran distributed them precisely because they expected to lose the larger platforms first. The midget submarines are the second punch, not the first, and they are still waiting.
The Insurance and Economic Fallout for Global Shipping
The financial ripple effects are already severe and likely to worsen. With tanker traffic through the Strait at near zero and over 150 vessels unable to transit, war risk insurance premiums for the Persian Gulf have entered uncharted territory. Lloyd’s of London and other major underwriters have either suspended coverage for Strait of Hormuz transits or raised premiums to levels that make voyages commercially unviable. For context, roughly 27 percent of the world’s maritime crude oil trade normally passes through this chokepoint — the disruption affects not just Gulf producers like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE, but every economy that depends on affordable energy imports.
The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations office has documented 16 attacks on shipping and four additional suspicious incidents through March 12 alone, a pace of aggression that shows no sign of slowing. Each attack reinforces the insurance industry’s risk models and pushes the timeline for normalized shipping further into the future. Even after hostilities eventually subside, the mine threat will linger for months or years — unexploded ordnance from the Iran-Iraq War tanker conflicts of the 1980s is still occasionally discovered in these waters. The economic cost of the current closure, measured in stranded petroleum alone, runs into billions of dollars per week.
What Comes Next for the Strait of Hormuz
The most likely near-term trajectory is a protracted standoff. Iran lacks the conventional naval power to challenge the U.S. Fifth Fleet directly — that capacity was destroyed in the first week of Operation Epic Fury. But the U.S. and its allies lack the mine clearance assets and persistent undersea surveillance infrastructure to declare the Strait safe for commercial traffic in any reasonable timeframe. Iran’s remaining Ghadir submarines, combined with its mine stockpile, shore-based missiles, and more than 80 percent of its fast-attack boat fleet, constitute a denial-of-access capability that does not require Iran to “win” in any traditional military sense. It only requires Iran to maintain enough risk that ship operators stay away.
The historical parallel is the Tanker War of 1987–1988, when Iranian mines and small-boat attacks disrupted Gulf shipping for months despite overwhelming U.S. naval superiority in the region. That conflict ended through diplomacy, not through the military elimination of Iran’s asymmetric capabilities. The current situation is more intense — the scale of attacks is greater, the weapons are more advanced, and the economic stakes are higher — but the strategic logic is similar. Iran’s midget submarines are not going to sink an aircraft carrier. They do not need to. They just need to keep tankers from moving, and right now, they are succeeding.
Conclusion
The destruction of Iran’s Kilo-class and Fateh-class submarines during Operation Epic Fury was a significant tactical achievement, but it did not eliminate the undersea threat to Persian Gulf shipping. More than 20 Ghadir-class midget submarines remain operational, armed with torpedoes and potentially cruise missiles, and operating in waters whose physical characteristics naturally favor small, quiet boats over the sophisticated detection systems meant to find them. Combined with an active mining campaign, shore-based missile batteries, and a largely intact fleet of fast-attack boats, Iran retains the ability to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed to commercial traffic for the foreseeable future.
For policymakers, shipping companies, and energy markets, the key takeaway is that military force alone is unlikely to reopen the Strait on any rapid timeline. The 15 million barrels per day of crude and 5 million barrels of other petroleum products that normally transit Hormuz will remain stranded until either Iran’s asymmetric capabilities are ground down through sustained operations — a process that could take months — or a diplomatic resolution changes the strategic calculus. The six seafarers already killed and the 150-plus ships waiting outside the Strait are early indicators of a crisis that is likely to deepen before it resolves. Anyone with exposure to Gulf shipping, energy commodities, or the broader supply chains they feed should be planning for extended disruption, not a quick return to normal.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many submarines does Iran have left after Operation Epic Fury?
Iran lost at least one confirmed submarine (likely the Kilo-class IRIS Taregh) and its three Kilo-class boats are all assessed as out of action. However, Iran retains 20 or more Ghadir-class midget submarines and several Nahang-class boats. The Fateh-class submarine’s status is less clear but it was likely damaged or destroyed in the initial strikes at Bandar Abbas.
Can Iran’s midget submarines actually sink a large commercial tanker?
Yes. The Ghadir-class submarines carry two 533mm torpedo tubes capable of firing weapons that can severely damage or sink commercial vessels. A modern heavyweight torpedo striking a tanker below the waterline can cause catastrophic flooding. The Ghadir boats may also carry the Hoot supercavitating torpedo, which travels at speeds exceeding 200 knots and leaves virtually no reaction time.
How much oil is affected by the Strait of Hormuz closure?
Approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude oil and 5 million barrels per day of other petroleum products normally transit the Strait. This represents roughly 27 percent of the world’s maritime crude oil trade. With traffic at near zero since early March 2026, the global supply disruption is among the largest in history.
Why can’t the U.S. Navy just clear the Strait and reopen shipping?
The challenge is layered. Iran has laid dozens of mines, retains over 80 percent of its small boats and minelaying capability, operates 20-plus midget submarines in acoustically difficult waters, and maintains shore-based anti-ship missiles. Clearing mines requires slow, vulnerable operations that themselves become targets. Each threat layer makes addressing the others harder, and Iran continues actively deploying new threats.
Has a submarine ever been sunk by an ATACMS missile before?
No. The sinking of an Iranian submarine by a U.S. Army ATACMS short-range ballistic missile during Operation Epic Fury was a first-of-its-kind engagement. The submarine was likely in port or on the surface at the time, but the successful strike demonstrates a new capability for land-based anti-naval operations.
Is it safe for commercial ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz right now?
No. As of mid-March 2026, the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) has issued Advisory 2026-004 warning against transits. The UK Maritime Trade Operations office has documented 16 attacks and 4 suspicious incidents. At least 13 commercial vessels have been hit, 6 seafarers killed, and tanker traffic has dropped to near zero. Over 150 ships remain anchored outside the Strait waiting for conditions to improve.